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Abstract 
Rebelo's  two-sector  endogenous  growth  model  is  embedded  within  a  two-country 
international trade framework. The two countries bargain over a trade agreement that 
specifies: (i) the size of the foreign aid that the richer country gives to the poorer one; (ii) 
the terms of the international trade that takes place after the aid is given. Foreign aid is 
given not because of generosity, but because it improves the capital allocation across the 
world and thus raises total world production. This world production surplus enables the 
rich country to raise its equilibrium consumption and welfare beyond their no-aid levels. 
To ensure it, the rich country uses a trade agreement to condition the aid on favorable 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the underlying economic rationale for linking foreign aid to trade 
agreements among developed and developing countries. We analyze a theoretical model 
in which two countries bargain over a trade agreement. The agreement specifies the size 
of the foreign aid to be given by a rich country to a poorer one, and the terms of the trade 
that takes place between the two countries after the aid is given. The aid in our analysis is 
given not because of any assumed generosity on the part of the rich country, but because 
it improves the capital allocation across the world and raises total world production. This 
world production surplus enables the rich country, through international trade, to raise its 
equilibrium consumption and welfare beyond their no-aid levels. To ensure it, and to 
push  consumption  and  welfare  as  high  as  possible,  the  rich  country  uses  a  trade 
agreement to condition the aid on favorable terms of trade.  
  An  important  assumption  in  our  model  is  that  international  loan  markets  are 
imperfect.
1  It is due to this assumption that aid can improve the capital allocation across 
the world and raise total world production. We also show how due to this increased world 
production it is possible that the rich country may benefit from giving the aid even if it is 
merely a gift in the sense that after the aid is given the trade between the two countries is 
perfectly free, rather than subject to the stipulations of an agreement. In contrast, when 
international  markets  for  loans  work  perfectly,  an  efficient  allocation  of  production 
factors can be supported by lending and borrowing, eliminating the potential economic 
                                                 
1  This  assumption  reflects  both  theoretical  and  empirical  findings.  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (2005)  justify 
theoretically why development banks give grants rather than loans to developing countries. Cohen, Jacquet 
and Reisen (2006) show that bilateral donors have favored grants over loans during the past three decades, 
and that in recent years, this preference has been emulated by multilateral aid agencies as well. 
  
  2 
benefits from giving aid. For the same reason we also assume that international labor 
mobility is imperfect.  
  The model is based on the two-sector growth model of Rebelo (1991) and on its 
two-country international trade extension developed by Felbermayr (2007). This model 
has several realistic virtues. First, it generates the empirically observed decline over time 
in the relative price of capital goods in terms of consumption.
2 Second, in the equilibrium 
of this model the developed country exports capital goods and the developing one exports 
consumption goods, as is typically the case in rich-poor countries trade relationships.
3 
The Rebelo  model provides us not only with endogenous  growth but also supplies a 
deviation from the Inada conditions, which is mandatory for specialization to emerge in 
equilibrium. Thus, this deviation is also important for the possibility that aid can raise 
total world production. 
We  model  the  negotiations  over  the  trade  agreement  according  to  the  Nash 
Bargaining mechanism presented in Nash (1950). This axiomatic mechanism alleviates 
the  need  to  specify  the  procedure  and  structure  of  the  negotiations.  Consequently,  it 
predicts an  outcome which  depends  only  on  feasible allocations  of  the  surplus  to  be 
created by the agreement and on the consequences of non-agreement. In that sense this 
Nash bargaining mechanism is better for our purposes than other bargaining mechanisms, 
such as the non-cooperative ones of the type studied by Rubinstein (1982). 
The  results  of  this  paper  shed  some  light,  then,  on  how  developed  countries 
manage  to  gain  more  than  developing  countries  from  establishing  bilateral  trade 
relationships, as seem to be indicated by World Trade Organization (WTO) empirical 
                                                 
2 See Cummins and Violante (2002) who calculate a decline of the relative price of capital goods in the 
United Stated at a rate of 3%-4% since 1974.  
3 See the evidence in Felbermayr (2007).  
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evidence. Computational general equilibrium analysis of the outcomes of the Uruguay 
Round  agreements  show,  for  example,  a  disproportional  GDP  benefit  to  developed 
countries, compared to that enjoyed by developing ones (Ackerman, 2005). Furthermore, 
Stiglitz (2002) argues that through the Uruguay Round developed countries have set a 
lopsided division of profits generated by globalization in their own favor, either through 
maintaining  agricultural  subsidies  given  to  farmers  in  the  developed  countries,  or  by 
legislating property rights that reflect solely the interests of firms in the developed world. 
Thus, understanding the economic forces behind such agreements can help interpreting 
their outcomes.  
An  important  feature  of  the  model  is  that  total  world  production  level  of 
consumption goods is higher under a trade agreement than it is with free trade. On the 
other hand, the growth rates of this output are lower in the trade agreement equilibrium 
compared to free trade. It is important to note, however, that the relatively slower growth 
with a trade agreement is due to initially improved allocation of factors among the trading 
parties under diminishing  marginal productivity. This is fundamentally  different  from 
results about growth rates in models where two countries interact strategically in a non-
cooperative manner. For example, in Devereux (1997) a tariff war mechanism reduces 
the world-wide growth rates compared to free trade, as in our model, but this is due to 
distortions inflicted by the tariffs that have adverse effects on production. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a survey of the 
relevant literature on trade agreements and their outcomes. Section 3 sets up the basic 
growth and trade model. Section 4 describes the free trade scenario. Section 5 analyzes 
the bargaining-based trade agreement equilibrium, and section 6 concludes.  
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2. A survey of the literature  
The  economic  relations  between  developing  and  developed countries  are  complex  by 
nature. These relations are based mostly on two channels. The first is the transfer of 
resources,  in  the  form  of  a  loan  or  foreign  aid,  from  the  developed  country  to  the 
developing one. The second is the trade between the two countries. These two channels 
are implicitly linked, as developed countries may tie the aid (or loan) to changing the 
terms of trade in their favor. Such links may improve the donor country's welfare at the 
expense of the developing country. 
Foreign aid can affect welfare through its impact on international trade, economic 
growth, or merely by increasing income in the recipient country.
4 However, the linkage 
of foreign aid to trade and growth outcomes has rarely been studied in the literature.  
Several studies explore the connection between aid and trade.
5 Among them, the 
theoretical ones typically assume that the trade policies of both countries, as well as the 
size of the transfer, are exogenous. They also assume that when foreign aid is tied to 
some policy changes in the recipient country, the tying rule is imposed exogenously, and 
usually link the aid to some measure of the poorer country’s expenditures rather than to 
its trade policies. The few articles who abstract from such assumptions use static models, 
which necessarily abstract from considering the growth implications of foreign aid and 
trade. Often, these articles study tariff wars rather than trade agreements as means of 
                                                 
4 Sometimes foreign aid might cause a decline in welfare in the recipient country. This phenomenon is the 
well-known ‘transfer paradox’. This paradox is not analyzed in the paper.  
5 For a full survey of the linkage between aid and trade see Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2007).  
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allocating  surplus.
6  In  contrast,  in  this  article  we  study  a  two-country  growth  model 
where foreign aid is tied to trade policies by an agreement between the two countries.  
We focus on bilateral trade agreements signed between a developing country and 
a  developed  one,  akin  to  the  kind  of  regional  bilateral  trade  agreements  that  were 
common during the 1990’s.
7 Both parties to such agreements typically  have to make 
concessions  on  different  issues,  including  the  complete  abolition  or  weakening  of 
protectionist policies that were in force prior the agreement. While such agreements have 
become more important and more widespread in recent years, there are still only few 
theoretical studies that attempted to study their general properties. Most of these studies 
concentrated on how bigger countries tend to win tariff wars, and typically employ static 
models, (e.g, Kennan and Riezman, 1988). Studies using dynamic models, like Devereux 
(1997), show that tariff wars reduce the world-wide growth rates compared to free trade, 
due to distortions inflicted by the tariffs.  
Trade  agreements  typically  include  restrictions  on  industrial  and  development 
policies that each country can use. Although such policies do not have the same direct 
impact on trade that tariffs and export subsidies have, they nevertheless can affect trade 
indirectly through their impacts on production activities. Wade (2003) argues that the 
agreements  that  arose  from  the  Uruguay  Round  –  TRIMS,  GATS  and  TRIPS  on 
investment, trade in services, and property rights respectively - benefit the block of the 
developed  countries  at  the  expense  of  the  block  of  the  developing  countries.  This 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed survey of this strand of the literature see the introduction in Lahiri, Raimondos-
Moller, Wong and Woodland (2002).  
7 For instance, since the early 1990s the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) has established an 
extensive network of contractual free trade relations all over the world, including Singapore, Egypt, Israel, 
Chile,  Mexico,  Croatia,  Colombia  and  Lebanon.  For  more  details  see  http://www.efta.int/content/free-
trade/fta-countries. 
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outcome occurs not through direct control of relative prices of commodities and trading 
volumes,  but  by  restricting  the  development  measures  that  developing  countries  can 
employ.  
Multilateral trade agreements can often take resemblance to a bilateral agreement 
between developed and developing countries with conflicting interests (as suggested in 
the previous paragraph). Most disputes preventing a new multilateral trade agreement 
among WTO members are between the block of developed countries led by European 
Union, USA and Japan, and the block of developing countries led by India, Brazil, China 
and South Africa. Clearly, the leading developed countries involved are those that also 
contribute most of the foreign aid. Hence, as we demonstrate in this study, important 
insights  about  the  links  between  foreign  aid  and  trade  agreements  can  be  gained  by 
considering them jointly in the context of a dynamic equilibrium model.
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3. The Basic Model 
Consider a world consisting of two economies, North and South, denoted N and S.
9 North 
is richer than South in the sense that it has a higher initial endowment of capital. Both 
economies  have  the  same  constant  population  size.  A  representative  agent  in  each 
economy seeks to maximize the following utility function: 
 


















ρ ρ , 
                                                 
8While Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that political rather than economic considerations underlie the aid 
given by developed countries in some cases, other studies, such as Asante (1985) claim that economic 
considerations typically motivate foreign aid. 
9  These  economies  may  be  either  two  countries  or  two  blocks  of  countries,  as  in  the  case  of  WTO 
negotiations. Without any loss of generality, we do not distinguish here between the two options.  
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where  ) (t c
i  is per-capita consumption at economy i at time t,  { } S N i , ∈ , ρ and θ are 
constants satisfying 0<ρ<1 and 0<θ<1. The agent has one unit of labor, supplies this unit 
inelastically, owns the capital in the economy and continuously rents it to firms. The 
lifetime budget constraint of the representative agent in each economy i is given by: 
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i
q  is the relative price of capital in terms of consumption goods in country i at 
time t, and  ) (t r
i ,  ) (t k
i  and  ) (t w
i  are, respectively, the interest rate, capital and real 
wage rate.  
Each country has two competitive production sectors, one for consumption goods 
and the other for capital goods. Consumption goods (per capita) produced in country i at 
time t, denoted by  ) (t c
i
P , are given by: 
 
(3)    [ ]
α
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where  1 0 < <α ,  ) (t k
i
C  is the amount of capital employed in producing  consumption 
goods in country i at time t and B is a technology productivity factor. The subscript P 
denotes production.  
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Capital  goods  are  producible  factors  of  production.  The  total  amount  of  new 
capital goods in country i at time t, is denoted by  ) (t q
i . The country i at time t local 








P − = , 
  
where A is a technology productivity factor and  ) (t k
i  is the per-capita amount of capital 
in country i at time t. With capital depreciation rate δ , the capital stock in each country 
evolves through time according to: 
 
(5)    ) ( ) ( ) ( t k t q t k
i i i δ − = & . 
 
In  a  competitive  equilibrium  all  markets  clear  at  each  point  in  time;  firms 
maximize current profits, while the representative household rents labor and capital to 
firms, and chooses consumption so as to maximize the lifetime utility in (1).  
  The analysis is carried out under the following parametric assumption: 
 
Assumption 1:  δ ρ δ θ α − < < − − A A ) )( 1 ( . 
 
The first inequality in Assumption 1 suffices to satisfy the transversality condition 
ensuring that utility is bounded. The second inequality is necessary for positive growth of 
consumption and capital.  
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3.1 Autarky Equilibrium 
We start with the case of autarky, to be used as a benchmark for evaluating free trade and 
trade  agreements  outcomes  later  on.  Under  autarky  consumption  and  investment  are 
based on local production alone, implying  ( ) ( ) t c t c
i
p
i =  and  ( ) ( ) t q t q
i
p
i = . Since this 
case was already analyzed by Rebelo (1991), results are presented here without proof.  
In Equilibrium, profits maximizing firms are indifferent at the margin between 
employing capital for producing consumption and capital goods. That is: 
 
(6)    [ ]
1










Each economy experiences no transitional dynamics, and grows along a Balanced 
Growth Path (BGP) with a constant interest rate, and with capital, consumption and the 
relative price of capital growing at constant rates, denoted gk, gc and gp respectively. 
Along the BGP, gk and gc are positive while gp is negative, implying that consumption 
and  capital  grow  over  time  while  the  relative  price  of  capital  falls  over  time.  These 
constant growth rates do not depend on initial capital stocks, and hence will be the same 
in both countries.  
In  an  autarkic  equilibrium,  a  constant  fraction  of  capital,  γ,  is  allocated  to 
producing consumption goods, so that the consumption in country i is given by: 
 
(7)    [ ]
α
γ ) ( ) ( t k B t c i i
A = ,  
 
where the subscript A refers to autarky, and γ is given by:  
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The difference in initial amount of capital, therefore, manifests itself through the 
levels of consumption and capital and not via their growth rates. 
 
4. The Model with Free Trade     
In this section we study the case where the two countries freely trade with one another. 
Specifically we assume that at t=0 the two economies unexpectedly start trading with 
each other and that from then on both countries face a common relative price between the 
two goods. Indeed, capital in the Rebelo (1991) model should not be taken literally as 
phyisical  capital.  Instead  the  model  should  be  viewed  as  a  reduced  form  of  more 
elaborate mechanisms of endogenous growth, such as learning-by-doing or endogenous 
technological change. Treating knowledge outcomes as physical capital, we implicitly 
assume that knowledge can be protected by its owner on the one hand, but can also be 
surrendered to others.  
The following  market clearing condition  must  hold at all times, reflecting the 
result that with free trade South specializes in producing consumption goods: 
 
(8)    [ ] [ ]
α α






FT + = + , 
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where the FT-subscript represents free trade. We adopt an extreme form of imperfection 
in international capital markets that precludes all lending and borrowing in capital. We 
also assume that labor is immobile across countries. This international trade extension of 
the Rebelo (1991) model was already studied by Felbermayr (2007), who established the 
results reported in the following sub-section 4.1.  
 
4.1 The free trade equilibrium 
Without  trade,  the  price  of  capital  goods  in  the  North  is  lower  than  in  the  South. 
Therefore, with trade the South imports capital goods, and exports consumption goods.  
At  all  times  the  North  produces  both  capital  and  consumption  goods  and 
producers  in  the  North  are  indifferent  at  the  margin  between  producing  capital  and 
consumption goods. Thus (6) holds for the North at all times. In contrast, in the South 
there are two possibilities depending on initial conditions. If  ( ) 0
S k  is sufficiently large, 
given  ( ) 0
N k , then (6) holds and both goods are produced in the South too. In that case 
the world is on a BGP. Otherwise, if  ( ) 0
S k  is sufficiently smaller than  ( ) 0
N k , then 
South  specializes  in  producing  consumption  goods  and  refrains  from  producing 
investment goods. We focus on the latter case from here onwards, and present below an 
explicit expression for the threshold level of  ( ) 0
S k  that distinguishes the two cases. 
The  specialization  starts  at  t=0  and  from  then  on  this  two-country  world 
experiences transitional dynamics towards a balanced growth path in which capital and 
consumption in each country grow at a constant rate. The specialization of the South in 
consumption goods persists throughout these dynamics. The specialization in the South 
implies that the world equilibrium relative price of capital goods satisfies:  
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(9)    [ ]
1











  The  inequality  in  (9)  is  strict  everywhere  along  the  convergence  to  BGP, 
approaches equality asymptotically, and holds with equality on a BGP.  
 
4.2. The balanced growth path 
As Felbermayr (2007) shows, along the BGP capital and consumption in both countries 
grow at constant rates which are the same as in autarky. The interest rates are equal in 
both countries which in turn implies equal  marginal products of capital in producing 
consumption, so that  ) ( ) ( t k t k
S N
C = . 
Going further beyond the results in Felbermayr (2007), in appendix A we show 
that if  ( ) 0
S k   and  ( ) 0
N k  are such that the world is on its BGP already at t=0 then 
consumption in each country satisfies:  
 
(10)    ( ) [ ]
α
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  Using (6), (10), (11) and  ) ( ) ( t k t k
S N
C =  in (8) yields in this case: 
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(12)    ( ) ( ) 0
2
0






The  RHS  of  (12)  provides  us  therefore  a  specific  formula  for  the  threshold  for 
specialization  that  its  existence  was  identified  by  Felbermayr  (2007).  Note  that  this 
threshold is smaller than k
N(0) since 0<γ<1. 
  The following Lemma establishes the productive efficiency of the BGP, a property 
we use in analyzing foreign aid tied to trade in a trade agreement. The lemma looks at the 
different allocations of a given amount of an initial total world capital to  ) 0 (
S k  and 
) 0 (
N k .  As  the  lemma  shows,  the  allocation  that  puts  the  world  on  a  BGP  also 
maximizes the total world production of consumption goods at each point in time.    
 
Lemma  1:  For  any  given  initial  aggregate  stock  of  capital 0 > K ,  world-wide 
consumption for all  0 ≥ t ,  ( ) ( ) t c t c
S N + , is maximized relative to all other free trade 
equilibrium allocations when  ) 0 (
S k and  ) 0 (
N k satisfy: 
 
(i)  K k k
N S = + ) 0 ( ) 0 ( , 
(ii)  ( ) ( ) 0
2
0






Proof Condition (ii) places the world on its BGP at t=0, implying that (9) holds as an 
equality  and  that  ) ( ) ( t k t k
N
C
S = ,  ensuring  equal  marginal  products  of  capital  in  
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producing consumptions across North and South at each point in time. This proves the 
claim given identical and concave production technologies in both countries.                 ■  
 
4.3 Free trade with aid 
As mentioned earlier, we focus on the case where initially South is sufficiently poorer 
than North. In that case, due to diminishing marginal product of capital in producing 
consumption  goods,  moving  capital  from  North  to  South  would  increase  world-wide 
consumption  without  reducing  future  world-wide  capital  stocks.  In  the  absence  of 
international capital markets, this capital reallocation can only be done through foreign 
aid. In particular, the aid can be such that it puts the world on a BGP. Let Tk denote the 
size of the aid that indeed places the world on the BGP. Also let 
N k 0  and 
S k 0  denote the 
initial pre-aid values of capital in North and South and let  ) 0 (
N k and  ) 0 (
S k  denote the 
post-aid  initial  capital  stocks  in  the  two  countries.  Thus,  ( ) k
S S T k k + = 0 0   and 
( ) k
N N T k k − = 0 0 . Then, from (12) we get: 
 










= γ .  
 
5. The Bargaining-Trade Equilibrium 
In the previous section we showed that if initially South is sufficiently poorer than North 
then aid can raise total world production. Building on that result we now turn to the case 
where the international trade between North and South is based on a trade agreement  
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which specifies the size of this aid alongside with policies that compensate North for 
transferring this aid. 
These  compensating  trade  policies  can  take  many  different  forms,  including 
tariffs, trade quotas, subsidies, or other policy tools affecting trade indirectly through 
their impact on production decisions. Since under perfect knowledge and rationality the 
outcome of a mechanism based on such tools is, at its bottom line, a division of surplus 
generated by cooperation, we do not specifically describe any of these policy measures. 
Instead, we assume that these compensating trade arrangements can be represented by a 
welfare transfer from South to North.  This allows us to use the bargaining mechanism as 
a solution concept for analyzing how the North can be compensated for giving foreign aid 
to the South, without invoking non-economic (e.g. altruistic or political) justifications. 
While the role of non-economic considerations is obvious and can be considerable, we 
want in this paper to examine how far purely economic considerations can go towards 
explaining observed ties between aid and trade policies. 
Since the agreement is about the division of worldwide welfare, it is optimal for 
the  two  countries  to  first  maximize  the  world  production  of  consumption.  Based  on 
Lemma 1, the two countries therefore would agree on the aid magnitude given by (13), 
which also places the world on the BGP. The actual bargaining is then over trade policies 
that divide the surplus created by the aid transfer, as we analyze in the next sub-section 
 
5.1 The Bargaining Setup 
To model the bargaining process over the trade agreement we employ the Nash (1950) 
axiomatic bargaining approach. This approach stipulates a compact and convenient way  
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to  formulate  a  bargaining  problem  the  solution  of  which  satisfies  four  properties: 
invariance  to  affine  transformations,  independence  of  irrelevant  alternatives,  Pareto 
efficiency and equal payoffs to symmetric bargaining problems. Our choice of utility 
function in (1) and the stationary nature of equilibrium paths examined motivate the first 
two properties. Following Chan (1988), we make the following two assumptions that 
justify our search for a solution which also satisfies the latter two properties: 
 
Assumption 2 The two countries have full information about preferences and technologies 
of both themselves and their trading partners. 
 
Assumption 2 allows us to require that the parties to the bargaining process will not settle 
on any solution that is dominated by another feasible solution.  
 
Assumption 3  Negotiators from each country have the same bargaining skill.  
 
Assumption 3, together with the fact that interest rates in both countries are equal along 
the BGP, imply that the bargaining solution should be symmetric in the sense that if the 
two countries are identical in all respects, their equilibrium payoffs should be equal.  
As  Nash  (1950)  shows,  these  four  properties  imply  that  the  solution  to  the 
bargaining problem is the unique solution of the following problem: 
 
(14)    ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { }
S S S N N N
c c
U c U U c U Max
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    s.t.  
 
(15)    ( )
α S S N k B c c 2 = + , 
 
where c
i represents the consumption level in country i at time 0 resulting from the Nash 
bargaining mechanism, 
S k is the post-transfer capital in the South at t=0, while  ) (⋅
i U  
and 
i U   are  the  life-time  utilities  of  the  representative  consumer  of  country  i  in  the 
cooperative solution and in case of disagreement, respectively. On BGP trajectories, both 
U
i  and 
i U can  be  represented  as  functions  of  consumption  at  0 = t only,  since 
consumption grows at a constant rate which is independent of initial capital endowments. 
Condition (15) follows from (8) using the BGP property 
N
c
S k k = . 
  Following Shapley, the disagreement point should reflect the credible destructive 
power of each player, and therefore it should be based on the minimal payoff that each 
country can secure for itself on its own. In our model, therefore, the disagreement point 
should be based on the autarky payoffs.  
Alternative disagreement points, such as the free-trade allocation with no aid, are 
not credible as threat points. A free trade unaccompanied by trade agreement can lead to 
each country imposing tariffs unilaterally in an attempt to extract welfare from the other 
country. Kennan and Riezman (1988) showed how big countries can win such tariff wars. 
In  Mayer  (1981)  and  Riezman (1982)  the  disagreement  points are  based  on  Johnson 
(1953) Nash-Cournot tariff equilibrium as a possible threat point. However, this threat 
may not be robust when other commercial policies (like quotas) are allowed. In order to  
  18 
cover any unilateral policy that each country can undertake in case of a disagreement, we 
find the autarky to be the most suitable alternative.  
Note that this choice for the disagreement point gives North an advantage, as its 
allocation  under  autarky  is  better  than  that  of  the  South.  Therefore,  no  ad-hoc 
assumptions on differential bargaining powers are exploited here.
10 
 
5.2 The Bargaining-Trade Outcome 
Proposition 1 Both countries are better off in equilibrium with trade and bargaining than 
in autarky, regardless of initial capital endowments. 
 
Proof: Equilibrium under a trade agreement and equilibrium under autarky are both on 
the BGP. Hence, by Lemma 1, the total production of consumption goods after the capital 
transfer is made is higher than in autarky. This implies that a pair of South and North 
consumption  levels  that  are  both  above  their  autarky  counterparts  is  feasible,  and 
consequently  the  Nash  product  given  by  (14)  is  strictly  positive  at  its  maximum.  A 
strictly  positive  product  implies  that  either  both  factors  are  positive  or  that  both  are 
negative. The latter possibility can be ruled out since the utility functions are strictly 
increasing. Thus, both countries are better off at the solution  ( )
S N c c ,  than they are in 
autarky.                                          ■ 
 
                                                 
10 In the general form of the Nash Product  ( )
N N N U c U − is raised by the power of β, where β represents 
bargaining power. Here we assume β=1 implying that the superior bargaining power of the North springs 
merely from 
S N U U >  and not also from β >1.  
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The  following  Proposition  2  shows  that  at  least  for  some  parameters  North 
receives greater welfare from a trade agreement than from free trade. 
 
Proposition 2: For some initial capital endowments, North is better off (and the South is 
worse off) under bargaining over trade and aid than under free-trade. 
 
Proof: Using in (1) the BGP property that  ( )
t g i i C e c t c =  for a constant gc, applying the 
resulting utility in (14) and maximizing the Nash product yields the following first order 
condition: 
 
(16)    ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0
1 1 1 1
= − − −








A c  is the consumption level under autarky in country i at t=0.  
Using (15) it is possible to define the LHS of (16) as the function:  
.  
(17)            ( )
S N N k k c H 0 0 , ,  ≡ 
             ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  

 
 − − − − −




N S N S N
A
N N c c k B c k B c c c . 
 
Note that 
N k 0  and 
S k 0 appear as arguments of H because they directly affect 
N
A c  
and 
S
A c  by (7), and 
S k  by (13). Evidently,  ( )
S N N k k c H 0 0 , ,  is strictly increasing in 
N c .    
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We now focus on the case where (12) holds, and show that in this case North 
finds the bargaining outcome better than the free trade outcome. To see that, note first 
that when (12) holds the free trade takes place along the BGP. Consequently, we can 
establish that North's utility under a trade agreement is larger than under free trade by 
comparing consumption at t=0 in the bargaining agreement and under free trade. We do 
so  by  showing  that  ( )
S N N k k c H 0 0 , ,   is  negative  when  evaluated  at  the  free  trade 
consumption  at  t=0.  Since  ( )
S N N k k c H 0 0 , ,   is  increasing  in  c
N,  this  implies  that  the 
argument that maximizes the Nash product is larger than the consumption level of the 
North under free trade. 
Suppose now that 
N k0  and 
S k0  do not satisfy (12) as an equality. By continuity of 
life-time utilities, if the proposition holds for the  ( )
S N k k 0 0 ,  combinations that satisfy 
(12), then it is also true for at least some neighborhood of these combinations.  
From (6), (10), (11), (12) and the result that along the BGP 
S N
C k k = , it follows 
that the consumption levels in the case of free trade satisfy: 
 
(18)    ( ) ( ) [ ] γ α
α
− + = 1 1




(19)    ( ) ( ) [ ] γ α
α
− − = 1 1 S S k B c . 
 
Using (7), (18) and x ≡1-γ  in (17) yields after simplifying:  
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(20)           ( )
S N N k k c H 0 0 , ,  = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 2
θ α θ θ α θ α
α α α
− − − − + + + − x x x x x k B
S . 
 
The RHS of (20) is negative if and only if the term in square brackets is negative, 
which we prove in appendix B. 
In the case where (12) holds no aid is required to put the world on its BGP and 
total world production is therefore the same under both a trade agreement and free trade. 
Thus, relative to free trade, since North receives more under a trade agreement – South 
gets less.                                    ■ 
 
Proposition  2  shows  that  the  bargaining  outcome  makes  North  better  off 
compared to free trade when 
S k 0  is equal to 
N k 0 2 γ
γ
−  and, by continuity, also on a certain 
neighborhood where 
S k 0  is smaller than 
N k 0 2 γ
γ
− . For smaller values of  
S k 0  outside such 
neighborhoods, the gap between what North gets under a trade agreement and what it 
gets under free trade is still positive, and in fact grows as 
S k 0 falls. To see that note that 
under  free  trade,  equilibrium  is  determined  by  the  intersection  between  demand  and 
supply rather than in a cooperative manner. Consequently, the declining world supply as 
S k0  falls, holding 
N k0  fixed, lowers North's welfare. In contrast, North's welfare under a 
trade agreement actually rises as 
S k0  falls, because the decline in 
S k0  also lowers South's 
welfare in the case of autarky and therefore lowers its bargaining power. Proposition 3  
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formulizes and proves this result. This is a rather interesting result because in this case 
too a lower 
S k0  reduces world output. 
 
Proposition 3: In the bargaining equilibrium, for any given  N k0 , 
N c is decreasing in  S k0 . 
Proof: See Appendix C                    ■ 
    
In summary, this section shows that North gains more from aid tied to trade, than 
from free trade, and that North's share of the surplus created by cooperative solution is 
higher the poorer is the other country.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we construct a dynamic model that combines international trade and foreign 
aid. We evaluate welfare in the donor and the recipient countries in the cases of autarky, 
free trade and under a trade agreement that contains both aspects of trade policies and aid. 
We  show  that  by  tying  the  foreign  aid  to  international  trade  policies,  welfare  is 
transferred  from  the  developing  country  to  the  developed  one  via  trade  agreements. 
While these trade agreements make both countries better off compared to autarky, they 
also  make  the  developed  country  better  off  compared  to  free-trade.  This  implies,  of 
course, that while the developing country prefers free trade to a trade agreement, it would 
still  be  better  off  under  the  trade  agreement  than  under  autarky,  and  thus  a  trade 
agreement is still acceptable.  
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Although  we  do  not  model  explicitly  the  trade  policies  over  which  countries 
bargain, we do show that there exist welfare transfers, which can emanate from direct 
resource transfers, or weakened subsidy or tariffs policies, which can be negotiated over 
along with foreign aid from the developed country to the developing one.  
This  result  sheds  some light  over  current negotiations  between  developed  and 
developing countries in the context of the Doha Round, and the present stalemate in these 
talks. According to its proponents, the last round of negotiations aims to make trade fairer 
for the developing countries,
11 and it is frequently referred as “The Doha Developing 
Round”. This round and its failure in Cancun, Mexico (2003), and later again in Geneva 
(2008) was partly attributed to the wide  gaps between the developed and developing 
countries. Furthermore, most computable general equilibrium measures of the forecasted 
outcomes of the Doha Round show not only low gains on the aggregate, but also skewed 
outcomes towards developed countries (Ackerman, 2005). We can forecast in light of our 
analysis, that if an agreement is eventually obtained, it will favor the developed countries 
rather than the developing ones, in contrast to the declared goals of these talks. 
 
Appendix A 
The lifetime budget constraint of the representative agent in each economy is given by 
(2). Since  ) ( ) ( t k t k
S N
C =  along the BGP, wages in both countries are equal and given by 
[ ]
α
α ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( t k B t w
S − = .  Thus,  along  the  BGP  wages  grow  at  a  rate  of  αgk.  As 
Felbermayr (2007) shows, consumption too grows along the BGP at a rate of gc=αgk. 
Hence, the lifetime budget constraint in each country can be written as: 
                                                 
11 For more details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doha_Round#cite_note-7.  
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(A1)   
( ) [ ]
( ) ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
− − ⋅ − + ⋅ = ⋅
0 0
) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( dt e k B k P dt e c
t r g S i
q
t r g i
FT
k k α α α α . 
 
As Rebelo (1991, p. 504) shows, the first order condition derived by the Current 




k g   and  ( ) k g A r α δ − − − = 1 .  Solving  these  two 
equations for r and gk yields: 
 
(A2)    γ α A r g k − = − . 
 
Applying (A2) and (6) in (A1) and simplifying yields (10) and (11).  
 
Appendix B 
In this appendix we complete the proof of Proposition 2  by showing that the RHS of 
(20) is negative. For that matter we define the RHS of (20) as the following function: 
 
(B1)    ( ) θ α, , x F  ≡  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 2
θ α θ θ α θ α α α
− − − − + + + − x x x x x . 
 
We  shall  now  show  that  F(x,  α,  θ)<0  for  any  set  of  values  for  x,  α,  and  θ 
satisfying 0<x<1, 0<α<1 and 0<θ<1. We do so by looking, without loss of generality, at 
the  pair  ( ) 0 0,θ α ,  where  0<α0<1  and  0<θ0<1  and  showing  that  ( ) 0 , , 0 0 0 = θ α F , 
( ) 0 , , 0 0 0 = θ α x F , and  ( ) 0 , , 0 0 < θ α x Fxx  for all 0<x<1.  
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(B2)    ( )
α
θ α, , x Fx  =   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 1 2
− − − − + + − − + + −
θ α θ θ α θ α θ α θ x x x x  
                 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 1
− − − − − − − − − − −
θ α θ θ α θ α θ α θ x x x x . 
 
  ( ) 0 , , 0 0 0 = θ α x F  follows directly from (B2). Differentiating the LHS of (B2) and 
simplifying, yields after tedious yet straightforward arithmetics: 
 
(B3)    ( )
( )( ) θ α α
θ α
− − 1 1
, , x Fxx  =  ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
) 1 ( 2 2
2 2





















which implies that: 
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x Fxx <  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )



























<  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )































      = 
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0 0 ) 1 ( 2
0





θ θ α θ θ α α α
− − − − − − −
−
+ x x
 < 0,  
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where the three inequalities are based on α0 , θ0  and x  being within the interval (0, 1). 
This establishes  ( ) 0 , , 0 0 < θ α x Fxx  which completes the proof. 
 
Appendix C 
In this appendix we show that c
N, the consumption of the North at t=0 under a trade 
agreement, is a decreasing function of 
S k 0 .  
  Due to (16) and (17): 
 
(C1)    ( )
S N N k k c H 0 0 , ,  = 0, 
 
which, according to the Implicit Function Theorem, defines c
N as an implicit function of  
S k 0  and 
N k 0 . Simplifying  (17) yields: 
 
 (C2)          ( )
S N N k k c H 0 0 , ,  =  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
θ θ α α θ θ − −





N S S N
A
N N c c k B k B c c c . 
 
Partial  differentiation  of  (C2),  bearing  in  mind  the  BGP  property  of 
( )
S N S k k k 0 0 2 + =
γ  and also that 
S
A c  is a function of 
S k 0  through (7), yields: 
 




k k c H
0
0 0 , ,
∂
∂
=  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
θ α θ α α
γ α θ αγ
− − − −
− + −




S N S S c k B c k B k B  
                        ( ) [ ] ( )( ) ( ) γ α θ






N S k B c c k B .  
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  Substituting  ( )
N S c k B −
α
2  by c
S, which follows from (15), and noticing that 
S S k k 0 >  because the South imports capital from North, leads to: 
 




k k c H
0





( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]
θ θ θ θ
α θ θ
αγ − − −












        > 
( )






− + + −
− − −
−


















1  = 0. 
 
The second inequality follows from the result that 
S S
A c c <  shown in Proposition 1.  
According to the Implicit Function Theorem, the derivative of c
N with respect to 
S k 0   is: 
 























This  derivative  is  negative  because the  numerator  is  positive  by (C4) and  the 
denominator is positive too, as follows immediately from (17).
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